What part of NO don’t you understand?

This morning’s Washington Post spurs me to ask: What part of NO don’t you understand? The “N” or the “O”.

It also reminds me that NO can stand for Nuclear Option. Which leads me back to the first question.

For those who see threats of or resorts to force as unacceptable, regardless of the alternatives or in the face of real existential threats, the lessons in the Middle East run contrary.

David Ignatius writes about “Misreading the Enemy: What we don’t grasp about militant Islam.” Next to that is an op-ed, “The Untold Story of Israel’s Bomb,” a shorter version of this in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, opposed to nuclear weapons under almost any circumstances.

Ignatius asks, with reference to Iran, “how do you resolve a confrontation with an adversary that appears unable or unwilling to negotiate a settlement?” Ignatius is pessimistic. Perhaps searching for some ephemeral ray of light, Ignatius ends with this misleading delusion:

The Muslim demand for respect isn’t something that can be negotiated, but that doesn’t mean the West shouldn’t take it seriously. For as the Muslim world gains a greater sense of dignity in its dealings with the West, the fundamental weapon of Iran, al-Quaeda and Hamas will lose much of its potency.

Ignatius, however, should have re-read his own column, to see what really works:

French analysts believe the Iranians displayed a similar refusal to negotiate during their long and bloody war with Iraq in the 1980’s. The exhausted Iraqis made efforts to seek a negotiated peace, but the Iranians rejected their feelers. After America and France covertly aided Saddam Hussein, the Iranians finally accepted a United Nations-mandated cease-fire in August 1988.

Even Iran is sane enough to read the writing on the wall, at least when it is seen as real. This stands in stark contrast to today’s European equivocation, Russia and China’s obstruction, and the United States’ appearing to call for directions from the back-seat, that Iran does not take seriously. (See here, and here, for the latest of Iran’s attitude of imperviousness.)

Ignatius might also have referred to the Middle Eastern satraps’ self-interest and extensive efforts to stir up anti-Western and anti-Israeli sentiment and actions, in order to distract their downtrodden peoples from their rulers’ self-enrichment at their expense. Pride, self and others’ respect, will only come when Middle Eastern peoples eject these satraps.

The “Untold Story of Israel’s Bomb” concludes: “It is time for a new deal…with Israel telling the truth and finally normalizing its nuclear affairs.” That normalizing -- in the eyes of those with moral equivalence, or in the eyes of those who would rather countenance anything, any horror, rather than contemplate the nuclear option -- would have Israel renounce its secretive nuclear capability, in the face of repeated and current calls and efforts by its regional neighbors to eradicate it.

I’ve heard stories (but not seen authoritative proof) that Israel told Nixon and Kissinger that it would resort to nuclear response as a last resort to prevent being overrun in the 1973 Yom Kippur War surprise attack. This prompted the late-in-the-day airlift of U.S. arms resupply – which arrived too late, as Israel’s generalship and citizen-resolve turned the tide, but did alert the Soviet Union to not up its ante of pre-supplying the Arab invasion.

“The Untold Story of Israel’s Bomb” does point out that in a 1969 meeting by Nixon with Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir:

Meir, in turn, probably acknowledged – taciltly or explicitly – that Israel had reached a weapons capability, but probably, pledged extreme caution. (Years later, Nixon told CNN’s Larry King that he knew for certain that Israel had the bomb, but he wouldn’t reveal his source.) Meir may have assured Nixon that Israel thought of nuclear weapons as a last-resort option…

Over time, the tentative Nixon-Meir understanding became the foundation for a remarkable U.S.-Israeli deal, accompanied by a tacit but strict code of behavior to which both nations closely adhered. Even during its darkest hours in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Israel was cautious not to make any public display of its nuclear capability.

Israel didn’t have to. Friends and foes knew full well – especially in those days of greater international respect for Israel’s steely, determined resolve -- that Israel very well may so respond rather than face eradication.

The lessons are clear for those who see, and obscured by those who shield their eyes.