Military Theory Vs. Practice in Iraq

The nature of warfare is usually each side exploiting its advantages and the other’s limitations. Strategy seeks this on the grand scale, and successful tactics conform and carry through.

However, aside from when outright in error, when strategic thinking is too obtuse or unlinked from realities on the ground, the strategy goes astray. Tactics and the troops are often blamed. But, that as much reflects back on the strategists’ failures to be realistic or operationalize their strategy.

The Washington Post’s expectation of the 3300-page Major General Bargewell report on command failures investigating the alleged Haditha incident is “that the U.S. military was inadequately prepared to conduct an effective counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq.” The narrow issue of whether rules-of-engagement were exceeded in the midst of an attack on U.S. forces in a known heavily hostile area seems to be used to launch wider strategic debate among the military leaders. If the Washington Post’s expectation is correct, poorly thought out or implemented command strategy in effect defends the Marines at Haditha from confusion. In fact, troops on the ground in Iraq are little confused by the overriding tactical imperative to do all necessary to defend their lives.

When discussion of military strategy is itself so convoluted in word salad language that even fellow scholars are fogged, not to mention those on the front who are expected to make sense of it and make it work, it’s less than useless. It’s counterproductive to both clear command and to public understanding.

My friend Mark Safranski, the explicator at ZenPundit blog, focuses on academic theorists’ discussions of strategy. I asked him to write about this problem of theory vs. tactics:

THEORY vs. PRACTICE:

The history of warfare carries with it many cliches – about armchair generals criticizing things they do not understand and real generals who prepare only to fight the last war. Ever since the first Gulf War, TV news programs have made the military analyst a staple “talking head” to better inform their viewers about unfolding battles. Many of them are retired officers, others are think tank academics or journalists. The best wear all three hats but oftentimes there is a serious disconnect between what is being discussed on TV and the reality of combat as experienced by our troops on the ground in Iraq.

While the nature of modern media coverage is partly to blame for this discrepancy, some of the fault lies with the current upheaval in military thinking. U.S. military doctrine is running far behind the technological, geopolitical and economic shifts wrought by globalization and defense intellectuals have rushed to fill the gap to help the Pentagon make sense of the new world. To outsiders, a bewildering array of terms have been created – OODA Loops, NCW, 4GW, Three Block War, PNM Theory, Global Guerillas, Strategic Corporals, EBO – that seek to provide commanders with insights and combat advantages.

Curious, I wanted to find out what professional soldiers thought of all this intellectual effort on their behalf. The Small Wars Council is a superb discussion board associated with The Small Wars Journal, edited and published by two Marine veterans, Dave Dilegge and Bill Nagle. Most of the participants in discussions are active duty personnel or experienced veterans, though diplomats, journalists, scholars and interested amateurs are also welcome. I posed a question to the board:

“How, if at all, have these theoretical exercises impacted what you do? Do you value these intellectual paradigms relative to your personal experiences?”

The answers I received were as profound as they were extensive.

* …the current fight in Iraq, given all its complexities, is better served by AARs [after action reports] and lessons learned, not dissertations by a fellow who has not spent a day (better a month) on the ground and outside the wire.

* …I've gained more from the 3/5 AAR (subsequently reprinted in the MCG) about urban combat in Fallujah than trying to make sense of a 4GW graph. If it takes someone 50 pages to make and argue their point, they've lost me.

* …purely academic theorists who model warfare without discomfort. I will say here that academic is probably an inaccurate term. Many are academic; many are the opposite who see warfare as a movie or video game. I have tried to tell people of this ilk that there is no background music on the battleground to key your senses when something is about to happen.

* …There is always a time lag in sifting through the information, and our most important sensors and shooters (Pfcs and LCpls) may be missing out. How great would it be to have a collection team pull 30 days with a deployed unit, then spend a week or two with a battalion pending deploy, discussing current lessons with a company at a time in a secure setting?

* …not only do I want warrior-athletes but I also want warrior-thinkers. Our current situation demands warriors-thinkers who can thrive in complex environments where, to paraphrase Tom, there are no black and white solutions.

* …If your job is orchestrating an air campaign, you will probably see more validity and relevance in the concepts behind NCW and EBO than in the ones behind the three-block war and 4GW. Not all of us approach and conduct warfare in the same manner. This is a good thing. Even within the services there is considerable disagreement over what each concept means and how it should be applied.

* …One of the scholars that comes to mind is Kenneth Pollack. I
remember he came to our base and talked extensively to the troops about Iraq before OIF kicked off… I use works like those of Pollack and others to get background on some of the issues that we might be facing in the future. …An amalgamation of views is always best for understanding some of the complex issues we are likely to face.

* …Clausewitz, OODA loops, EBO, 4GW, etc. all have their application, but the fact that they are known equates to biased perceptions. What set of glasses are you looking through?

* …I try to stay away from authors with political agendas that might provide overly-biased assessments on the issues. I don’t think war and partisan politics mix very well when you are in a combat situation. I try to instill in my people that we don’t fight as Democrats or Republicans, we fight as Americans.”

Remarkably well said.

Theory, obviously has a place in organizing information and the veterans asked for critical information that was relevant and of a size realistic to prepare their troops in a short period of time. The military can do much more to facilitate this request but so can the theorists, so can bloggers and so can the rest of us.

For starter's, CENTCOM can do more, as the SWC members suggested, to integrate the cutting edge insights of " old hands" in Iraq with new troops starting a deployment by making such firsthand interaction a priority. Secondly, cultural intelligence programs for junior officers, NCO's and enlisted personnel can be made much more robust. A few hours isn't really sufficient preparation for counterinsurgency warfare in Iraq.

Theorists come in to play by connecting their abstruse concepts to current real world problems that are relevant at various ranks. Some theorists, like John Robb, have the military experience and do so in their writings. Others like Tom Barnett and William Lind have reached out to interact with personnel in uniform, share information and receive critical feedback. This is excellent but the results should be widely disseminated.

Bloggers and scholars can help the troops here most by acting as a filter for what is often an unmannageably large mass of open source information and reducing it to concise, clear and accurate messages. Information can only turn into knowledge when communication and comprehension are in play - the troops are not just short on the information they need but time for reflection as well. We at home have the luxury of such time so let's try to assist those who do not.