How Realistic Is The ISG “Realist Manifesto”?

The Washington Post’s analysts call the Iraq Study Group’s report “The Realist Manifesto.” A manifesto being a statement of political beliefs, that much is accurate. Calling it realistic is another thing.

The New York Times’ summary, for example, seeks to make it seem so by citing Henry Kissinger:

Henry Kissinger, former secretary of state, has endorsed the idea of involving Syria and Iran in the discussion of Iraq’s future, suggesting that they be included in an international conference.

However, Kissinger’s long analysis of last Sunday says something quite different than let’s have a conference and invite the neighbors:

A diplomacy that excludes adversaries is clearly a contradiction in terms. But the argument on behalf of negotiating too often focuses on the opening of talks rather than their substance. The fact of talks is assumed to represent a psychological breakthrough. The relief supplied by a change of atmosphere is bound to be temporary, however. Diplomacy – especially with an adversary – can succeed only if it brings about a balance of interests. Failing that, it runs the risks of turning into an alibi for procrastination or a palliative to ease the process of defeat without, however, eliminating the consequences of defeat….

The self-confident Iranian leaders may facilitate a local American retreat but, in their present mood, only for the purpose of turning it into a long-term rout. The argument that Iran has an interest in negotiating over Iraq to avoid chaos along its borders is valid only as long as the United States retains a capacity to help control the chaos. There are only two incentives for Iran to negotiate: the emergence of a regional structure that makes imperialist policies unattractive, or the concern that, if matters are pushed too far, America might yet strike out.

So long as Iran views itself as a crusade rather than a nation, a common interest will not emerge from negotiations….

The “common interest” that Iran and Arab states have is the destruction of Israel. There’s no evidence or sense in thinking that Iran or the Arab states would have or may be any more reasonable or responsible if Israel didn’t exist. But, what do the ISG “realists” propose but to toss Israel’s security to the wolves as a sop for the U.S. being allowed to supposedly retreat gracefully from the Middle East, as if such were realistically possible given the ensuing chaos or the loss of U.S. credibility throughout the world, or in insane hopes that Iran or Arab countries would then act responsibly.

As AFP reports, eyebrows are raised at the ISG’s use of the Palestinian jargon for overwhelming Israel:

"'Right of return' is not in Oslo I or Oslo II, it's not in the Bush Rose Garden speech, it's not even in UN 181, the original partition resolution -- it's part of the Palestinian discourse," said the US analyst.

For a comprehensive analysis of the portions of the ISG report dealing with Israel, see this Fact Sheet. Here’s the opening and closing. Read it all in between for the facts.

The report asserts that the conflict is “inextricably linked” to the situation in Iraq. This is demonstrably false. If the conflict ended tomorrow or Israel disappeared, it would have no impact whatsoever on the situation in Iraq. The violence is based on internal political, social, economic and religious rivalries that are completely unrelated to Israel. The interjection of prescriptions for solving the Arab-Israeli conflict was apparently done to satisfy the authors’ desire to weigh in on issues that were beyond its mandate….

The conflict involving Israel is too important and complex to be relegated to a series of bullet points in a 142-page document on an unrelated topic.

Then, decide how “realistic” the ISG is, or how much it is actually only a realistic portrayal of a serious internal political manifesto’s threat to Israel’s survival. Other portions of the ISG report should be, similarly, appreciated for what they represent: defeatism, self-centerdness, even some elements of short-term pragmatism, but not long-term realism if one cares for a stable, peaceful Middle East friendly to U.S. security and moral interests.

ALSO see here for the repudiation of the ISG's military recommendations by its own military advisors, who were ignored by the ISG panel.