Check List for the President’s Speech

The White House Office of Public Liaison issued the below outline of President Bush’s speech tonight.

It is a useful check list for several purposes:
1. It displays some of the prior errors and self-limitations that have reduced the effectiveness of our forces and the mission, particularly in the tepid support of local U.S. commanders to match their fighting prowess with their reconstruction skills, necessary in a counterinsurgency, and in the tolerance of the internecine and corrupt performance of too much of the Iraqi government, and it re-emphasizes the importance of both restraining and enlisting the neighboring states to Iraq in responsibility for the outcomes. While much has been done right, much has been done wrong, and what has been done wrong mostly entails timidity and lethargy more than lack of intelligence.

2. It will serve as a punch list for measuring future progress, not in a mathematical formula, or in a smooth flow chart, but at least in terms of more-and-less item by item and overall.

3. It will be a handy way to see how the news coverage of the speech either is comprehensive and knowledgeable or spotty and superficial, constructive or automatically negative.

4. Lastly, the so-called “surge” of perhaps another 10-15% more troops (although more than that in being focused on fighters and not rear echelon), while being overblown somewhat, is both a barometer of past understaffing the front (even if our forces available are too limited for our worldwide challenges) and indicates how relatively little we’re anymore willing to commit. Most important will be whether they are allowed the vigorous rules-of-engagement necessary to rooting out entrenched fanatics in highly defensible positions. This will reflect how much confidence our military still has that they won’t be left hanging for the unavoidable collateral damage and death of real war, how sincere their military and political leaders about supporting the troops when it really counts, and how more exercised the war’s foes would rather be by (enemy propaganda inflated or invented) harsh events than about the consequences of half-steps to our troops’ safety or the success of the mission.

Below is the speech's outline issued by the White House Office of Public Liaison:

The New Way Forward In Iraq

The President's New Iraq Strategy Is Rooted In Six Fundamental Elements:
1. Let the Iraqis lead;
2. Help Iraqis protect the population;
3. Isolate extremists;
4. Create space for political progress;
5. Diversify political and economic efforts; and
6. Situate the strategy in a regional approach.

Ø The Consequences Of Failure In Iraq Could Not Be Graver – The War On Terror Cannot Be Won If We Fail In Iraq. Our enemies throughout the Middle East are trying to defeat us in Iraq. If we step back now, the problems in Iraq will become more lethal, and make our troops fight an uglier battle than we are seeing today.

Key Elements Of The New Approach: Security

Iraqi:
· Publicly acknowledge all parties are responsible for quelling sectarian violence.
· Work with additional Coalition help to regain control of the capital and protect the Iraqi population.
· Deliver necessary Iraqi forces for Baghdad and protect those forces from political interference.
· Commit to intensify efforts to build balanced security forces throughout the nation that provide security even-handedly for all Iraqis.
· Plan and fund eventual demobilization program for militias.

Coalition:
· Agree that helping Iraqis to provide population security is necessary to enable accelerated transition and political progress.
· Provide additional military and civilian resources to accomplish this mission.
· Increase efforts to support tribes willing to help Iraqis fight Al Qaeda in Anbar.
· Accelerate and expand the embed program while minimizing risk to participants.

Both Coalition And Iraqi:
· Continue counter-terror operations against Al Qaeda and insurgent organizations.
· Take more vigorous action against death squad networks.
· Accelerate transition to Iraqi responsibility and increase Iraqi ownership.
· Increase Iraqi security force capacity – both size and effectiveness – from 10 to 13 Army divisions, 36 to 41 Army Brigades, and 112 to 132 Army Battalions.
o Establish a National Operations Center, National Counterterrorism Force, and National Strike Force.
o Reform the Ministry of Interior to increase transparency and accountability and transform the National Police.

Key Elements Of The New Approach: Political

Iraqi:
· The Government of Iraq commits to:
o Reform its cabinet to provide even-handed service delivery.
o Act on promised reconciliation initiatives (oil law, de-Baathification law, Provincial elections).
o Give Coalition and ISF authority to pursue ALL extremists.
· All Iraqi leaders support reconciliation.
· Moderate coalition emerges as strong base of support for unity government.

Coalition:
· Support political moderates so they can take on the extremists.
o Build and sustain strategic partnerships with moderate Shi'a, Sunnis, and Kurds.
· Support the national compact and key elements of reconciliation with Iraqis in the lead.
· Diversify U.S. efforts to foster political accommodation outside Baghdad (more flexibility for local commanders and civilian leaders).
o Expand and increase the flexibility of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) footprint.
o Focus U.S. political, security, and economic resources at local level to open space for moderates, with initial priority to Baghdad and Anbar.

Both Coalition And Iraqi:
· Partnership between Prime Minister Maliki, Iraqi moderates, and the United States where all parties are clear on expectations and responsibilities.
· Strengthen the rule of law and combat corruption.
· Build on security gains to foster local and national political accommodations.
· Make Iraqi institutions even-handed, serving all of Iraq's communities on an impartial basis.

Key Elements Of The New Approach: Economic

Iraqi:
· Deliver economic resources and provide essential services to all areas and communities.
· Enact hydrocarbons law to promote investment, national unity, and reconciliation.
· Capitalize and execute jobs-producing programs.
· Match U.S. efforts to create jobs with longer term sustainable Iraqi programs.
· Focus more economic effort on relatively secure areas as a magnet for employment and growth.

Coalition:
· Refocus efforts to help Iraqis build capacity in areas vital to success of the government (e.g. budget execution, key ministries).
· Decentralize efforts to build Iraqi capacities outside the Green Zone.
o Double the number of PRTs and civilians serving outside the Green Zone.
o Establish PRT-capability within maneuver Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs).
· Greater integration of economic strategy with military effort.
o Joint civil-military plans devised by PRT and BCT.
o Remove legal and bureaucratic barriers to maximize cooperation and flexibility.

Key Elements Of The New Approach: Regional

Iraqi:
· Vigorously engage Arab states.
· Take the lead in establishing a regional forum to give support and help from the neighborhood.
· Counter negative foreign activity in Iraq.
· Increase efforts to counter PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party).

Coalition:
· Intensify efforts to counter Iranian and Syrian influence inside Iraq.
· Increase military presence in the region.
· Strengthen defense ties with partner states in the region.
· Encourage Arab state support to Government of Iraq.
· Continue efforts to help manage relations between Iraq and Turkey.
· Continue to seek the region's full support in the War on Terror.

Both Coalition And Iraqi:
· Focus on the International Compact.
· Retain active U.N. engagement in Iraq – particularly for election support and constitutional review.