4GW Primer

No, that’s not 4th Grade Writing Primer; But, for those who wonder about all the talk of it, it’s 4th Generation Warfare Primer.

My good friend Mark Safranski, The ZenPundit, is an essential read for anyone who wants to understand the thinking on how to handle the sociopoliticomilitary -- they are entwined -- challenges we face (plus he has gotten pretty good at cool graphics).

Many get lost in the verbiage of 4GW, and much of it is old wine in new bottles.

For my and my readers’ clarification, Mark offers the following.

Q: What is "Fourth Generation Warfare?"

According to advocates of this theory, Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) is a stage of conflict between nation-states and decentralized non-state opponents ( insurgents, tribes, organized crime, gangs, terrorists) where one of the most important variables in determining victory is the perceived moral legitimacy of the state. If the state collapses into anarchy or becomes so politically discredited that it no longer can maintain the loyalty of its citizens, then the 4GW forces "win".

Q: So then, how is 4GW any different from regular, old fashioned, guerilla warfare like in Vietnam or El Salvador ?

4GW is different from traditional insurgency for reasons of structure, motivation and environment.

The Communist guerilla armies in China, Vietnam and El Salvador were organized into rigid, well-disciplined, hierarchies that were trying to build-up in stages into a traditional, conventional army that could fight on an open battlefield, defeat their enemy and take over the state. 4GW forces are loose, decentralized, networks that share a common enemy but have various reasons for fighting. Often they don't care about taking over the government so much as being able to dominate their particular ethnic or religious community, smuggle contraband freely or make war against traditional enemies.

Finally, the geopolitical environment has changed due to globalization, the fall of the Soviet Union and the revolution in information technology to give advantages to small, fast-moving, "flat" networks over larger, slower, heavily centralized bureaucracies of nation-states.

Q: Who came up with this theory ? Is it widely accepted ?

4GW theory was first articulated by the William Lind and a number of military associates in 1989 with an article in the Marine Corps Gazette entitled " The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation".(1) Parallel contributions were made by the respected Israeli military historian, Martin van Creveld, in a series of books, starting in 1991. (2) 4GW theory also draws heavily upon the ideas of the late strategist Colonel John Boyd, USAF who was also deeply influential in the development of the Manuver Warfare doctrine of the U.S. Marine Corps, US Air Force Fighter Tactical doctrine; fighter aircraft design and the development of Network-centric Warfare programs. (3)

As a school of thought, 4GW remains generally unknown to the public but is highly controversial in military and political circles. This is due in no small part to the bitter criticisms some of its advocates have made of mainstream military thinking, Pentagon waste and the leadership qualities of senior officers, particularly in the U.S. Army. Academic historians and political scientists criticize the 4GW school for the use of " selective history" and for insufficient rigor in their definitions of 4GW.

On the other hand, the 4GW school has been far more accurate in their assessments of the problems posed by the Iraqi insurgency and their predictions of the outcome of the recent Israeli-Hezbollah War, than were mainstream military experts. For this reason and the public's revived interest in counterinsurgency due to "the Surge", more attention is being paid to 4GW concepts.

Q: What are the other generations of warfare? Why "generations" anyway?

Generations were used to create a loose historical taxonomy in which to categorize both methods of fighting war as well as the cultural and strategic mindsets behind them. It's probably an error to take this model too literally as a strict sequence of events. The other generations are:

First Generation(1GW): Warfare of the smoothbore musket and tightly disciplined columns of professional soldiers like those of Napoleon, Frederick the Great, George Washington and so on.

Second Generation (2GW): Warfare of annihilation by rigidly organized mass armies, often in fixed positions, heavily dependent on central organization and massed firepower. The Western Front in WWI is the paramount example.

Third Generation Warfare (3GW): Warfare of manuver, speed and shock where unit commanders are expected to exercise initiative to exploit opportunities. The German Blitzkrieg of early WWII was the first example, Manuver Warfare of the Marines is another.

There is much speculation about a possible emerging Fifth Generation (5GW). One 4GW expert, Colonel T.X. Hammes, author of The Sling and the Stone, claims it is here. William Lind, "the Father of Fourth Generation War" has replied with a decisive denial.(4) No consensus exists on what 5GW might look like, though suggestions of " superempowered individuals", secret conspiracies and John Robb's "Global Guerillas" thesis have been offered as possibilities. (5)

Q: Why is all of this important?

It is highly unlikely that in the near or medium term future, that the United States will face a great power enemy on the open battlefield, at least on land. Our dominance in high tech, conventional, warfare is so great and fielding a comparable military force against ours is so mind-bogglingly expensive, that most great powers are content to be our allies or eschew direct military conflict.Instead, our state adversaries are likely to avoid our strengths ( nuclear or conventional war) and seek to harm us through terrorism, psychological warfare, criminal activity, subversion, guerilla warfare, cyberwar and other indirect methods.

At the same time, failed states and globalization have made it possible for non-state actors to wage war against us independently or in shifting alliances with like-minded groups or hostile states. Where we once faced one, large, enemy in the Soviet Union, today and in the future it will be more like a kaleidescope of transient foes or a swarm of angry hornets. Preparing to meet that kind of challenge means American leaders facing up to the concerns of the 4GW school or those raised by more traditional counterinsurgency and counterterrorism experts. The strategic threats we face as a nation are not going to go away on their own.

Footnotes:

1. http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/4th_gen_war_gazette.htm
2. Van Creveld's most cited works by the 4GW school include The Transformation of War (1991); The Rise And Decline of The State (1999) and his recent The Changing Face of War ( 2006), where van Creveld explicitly argues for the overriding importance of the moral and political variables in modern warfare.
3. http://www.belisarius.com/modern_business_strategy/coram/boyd_at_tech.pdf ; for network-centric warfare and Boyd, see: http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0JIW/is_1_54/ai_75762213/pg_10
4. http://www.d-n-i.net/lind/lind_2_03_04.htm
5. http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2006/10/the_changing_fa.html