U.S. Tongue-Ties Self In Talking To World

Below is a guest post from Matt Armstrong, on a crucial topic central to the U.S.’s ability, lacking thusfar, to act and respond effectively in the international information war in which we are engaged. Matt Armstrong’s bio:

Matthew C. Armstrong, whose blog is MountainRunner, writes on public diplomacy, irregular warfare and counterinsurgency, civil-military relations, and the outsourcing of force, each of which should be looked at as a spoke connected to a hub of perception management, strategic communications, or public diplomacy (depending on your own professional culture). Matt Armstrong has published book chapters and journal articles and presented at conferences and workshops on public diplomacy, the privatization of force, and unmanned warfare.

Prior to this, he spent a decade working as a technologist designing knowledge management systems subsequently developing high-value competencies in areas of internet influence. Mr. Armstrong obtained both his B.A. in International Relations and Master of Public Diplomacy at the University of Southern California (USC). He has also done work at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth on topics of U.S. Intelligence, Contemporary European Security, and the Middle East. He is a fellow of the Proteus USA, a forward-looking think tank sponsored by The Office of the Director for National Intelligence and the U.S. Army War College’s Center for Strategic Leadership.

Matt Armstrong is, also, a recovering Ironman triathlete (5 starts, four finishes), runner (a couple dozen marathons + several ultramarathons), and ocean swimmer (3mi was my favorite distance). He also briefly made a living as a professional coach and used to hold coaching certificates from USA Cycling (Level II), USA Triathlon, USA Track & Field, and USA Swimming (or rather USA Swimming's accreditation organization). The name "Mountain Runner" comes from the fact that he enjoys trail running and fastpacking, especially with his dogs.

Changing US Information Strategy: Effective Talking To World

By Matt Armstrong

GWU professor Marc Lynch, perhaps more commonly known as Abu Aardvark, revealed the positions on public diplomacy of the current presidential candidates:

I came across something interesting while doing some research on public diplomacy for an unrelated project. Since at least the 9/11 Commission Report, almost every foreign policy blueprint or platform has for better or for worse mentioned the need to fix American public diplomacy and to engage with the "war of ideas" in the Islamic world. I expected all three remaining Presidential candidates to offer at least some boilerplate rhetoric on the theme. What I found was different.

Marc highlighted the differences between the presidential candidates on what is arguably the most important and yet least understood element of our national security. At the end of his post, he challenged John Brown, Patricia Kushlis, and this blogger to offer our thoughts. Patricia at Whirled View responded, as did John Brown and a few others. I suggest you read their responses.

The central theme underlying the candidates’ positions is, of course, the use of persuasion to shape desirable outcomes. The ability to influence has broad implications beyond physical security issues like terrorism. Economic security (think trade and tourism) and the effectiveness of traditional diplomacy are impacted as well. While, as Marc tells us, Clinton avoids the subject of public diplomacy (and apparently the concept as well), McCain and Obama focus too narrowly on the current struggle. The result is recommendations that are bound to fail.

To begin with, we must accept that the romantic days of the United States Information Agency are gone. So many confuse the USIA and the other information services, such as Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, of recent decades with the USIA that was engaged in the active psychological struggle that largely ended with détente and the finalizing of the European partition.

Unlike half a century ago, the U.S. military has a clear voice and is arguably our dominant public diplomat. Therefore, simply resurrecting “USIA” without reorganizing our national information capabilities across civilian and military lines would turn it into just another voice struggling to be heard over America’s military commanders, spokespersons, and warfighters.

The candidates must look deeper than re-creating an agency and or re-establishing old outreach programs. They must show strong leadership and have a bold vision to rally the government and country to adapt to a world that requires understanding the information effect of action, agile response capabilities, and above all, credibility and trust.

What needs to change?

First and foremost, we must revisit and discuss the purpose and intent of the prohibitions of Smith-Mundt Act of 1948. Debated and enacted to improve the quality of our responses to adversarial propaganda during the communications revolution of the 1940s, it was based on the communications market of the time. It is now invoked to prevent any potential communication that might possibly be heard or seen by Americans. This fear of being overheard in America has done more to neuter U.S. responses and to encourage the creation of new information functions than anything else. We have created an information architecture that cares more about how a broadcast, flyer, or message will play in Iowa than in the primary center of gravity of the fight: the minds of the support base of our adversary. The result is timid responses and artificial self-containment out of touch with the virtual geography of today’s psychological landscape.

The Smith-Mundt Act was the product of a particular time and place. By the mid-1940’s, it was clear the Soviet Union was spending heavily on propaganda in Western Europe and, despite the lies and distortions, it was having an impact. Friends, foes, and neutrals were second guessing previously positive perceptions of the United States. American propaganda, on the other hand, was at best a “silent whisper” that had little to no effect or worse, was counterproductive.

By 1947, in the backdrop of the vigorous debates over the National Security Act of 1947, Congress had enough and cut the funding for the Department of State’s Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs (OIC) and by extension, the radio station of American outreach, the Voice of America (VOA). Congress was not questioning the act or need to propagandize, it was responding to the extremely poor quality and haphazard nature of U.S. efforts in light of communist inroads into Western public opinion.

The key threat was not an overt invasion by the Soviet Union or its allies to take territory through military force, but the fear of communists capitalizing on economic and social unrest to expand their power and control through subversion and manipulation. To those paying attention at the time, policy and propaganda were inextricably intertwined. One of the most important realists of the time, Hans Morgenthau, noted that national morale and the quality of diplomacy, two of his nine elements of national power, were inherently unstable and subject to the effectiveness of domestic and foreign strategic influence. The struggle for authority and relevance had shifted from the arena of power to the arena of ideas and international persuasion.

Concerns over internal propagandizing focused on a government news service that might dominate the domestic media market. In this regard, two antecedents were cited in debating the Act. First was the Nazi domination of domestic media and its role in the rise of Hitler and the second was the Committee for Public Information (CPI) in World War I. The CPI was widely viewed as a personal news agency of President Woodrow Wilson. The most substantial resistance came from those defending the investments and market share of private and corporate radio and press. The issue was not that propagandizing to the American public was wrong, but that a government news service might dominate domestic media and thus infringe on a free press and the right to make a profit. William Benton, the State Department’s champion for Smith-Mundt, not only worked closely with American news broadcasters and business leaders to support the Act, but later collaborated with them to shape domestic information activities. It was not about the information, but who delivered it.

We must focus on the requirements of a high-quality and integrated information apparatus that emphasizes that which is on our side: the truth. This means removing then-useful constraints on domestic competition. Then as it is today, weak American information and outreach programs were not just a liability but a strategic threat.

Second, our information bureaucracies have become cylinders of excellence (or “stovepipes” for the less sarcastic) based not on effects but means and with limited to no interoperability or coordination. The different working philosophies of the State Department and the Defense Department challenge the ability to create a cohesive U.S. narrative. The State Department’s Public Diplomacy, for example, is configured to influence over an extended period of years or decades. Rarely is it intended to shift ideas and perceptions over months or even weeks.

The Defense Department runs by a different clock. Defense Department groups, from Public Affairs and Information Operations and to Psychological Operations, work proactively and frequently as part of a multifaceted approach to shape outcomes both during and immediately after an event. The extended Defense timeline includes State-like longue durée approaches, but it mostly operates in the “here and now” because of the need to respond to the current battlefield.

Capacity problems at State and the absence of anything like the lamented USIA, the civilian organizations traditionally charged with outreach and persuasion campaigns, further compelled the military to step up and respond to the battlefield of today and tomorrow. It is the Defense Department that is now in the “last three feet” of engagement with foreign publics, either directly or in the media. The Secretary of Defense is asked more frequently than the Secretary of State about resurrecting the United States Information Agency. Furthermore, as the Bush Administration has intentionally shifted the virtual ownership of the wars on to the military, today news from the field comes primarily from uniformed personnel.

The U.S. military is a reluctant heir to the information throne in an online world and suffers several inherent challenges. First, operating in the environment of New Media requires awareness and agility inconsistent with the current organizational culture of the military. For example, in Iraq the military broke through the bureaucratic red-tape and started posting videos on YouTube. However, this small “victory” was incomplete: the group that uploaded to YouTube was still not permitted to view YouTube. In effect, they were posting information they were not authorized to see.

The U.S. might not be able to prevent our enemies from disseminating information, but we could and must engage them in the information sphere. Without engagement “actions are often abandoned to interpretation” and are left “hanging outside the narrative to be picked up.” Too often they are placed within a context of the listener’s choosing or risk cooption by a third-party to reinforce an alternative narrative.

Third, we must better understand root causes of radicalization and disenfranchisement. Responding to this requires more than words, but deeds. As I wrote elsewhere, enduring change comes from systemic overhauls that stabilize unstable regions. Security, humanitarian relief, governance, economic stabilization, and development are critical for democratization. Failing to address grinding poverty and disillusionment in regions creates fertile breeding grounds for extremists, terrorists, and insurgents to attack the national interests of the United States. These are the real propaganda of deeds. Without competent and comprehensive action in these areas, tactical operations are simply a waste of time, money, and life.

Deeds are not the only factor at work in “contested spaces.” People who are tired and oppressed mind it more when they realize not everyone is tired and oppressed. Matching deeds and words is important to inoculate against adversarial propaganda that creates terrorist and insurgent foot soldiers based on lies.

Edward R. Murrow, the only chief of the United States Information Agency who regularly attended National Security Council meetings, famously stated that public diplomacy must not only be in on the “crash landings” but also at the take-offs. This is true of any attempt to persuade or compel, which are the goals of both foreign policy and military operations. It is essential that the information effects of what we do are considered from the outset, including the impact of information campaigns.

Sixty years ago, the elements of America’s national power – diplomacy, information, military, and economics, or DIME – were retooled to meet an emerging threat with the National Security Act of 1947 and the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948. Then as it is today, the U.S. was engaged in a war of ideas and perceptions both globally and domestically, however the importance and impact of Smith-Mundt is ignored despite its influence, often negative, on every aspect of America’s informational arsenal.

This year the Defense Department will look into how the National Security Act of 1947 should be modified to adapt to 21st Century conflict. The candidates should be bold and argue for a more holistic self-analysis.

Our information systems suffer from inflexibility and internal resistance rooted in a misunderstanding of Smith-Mundt that requires updating to conform to a reality that makes separating audiences by geography both impractical and undesirable. This will not be a conflict over hearts and passions, but a psychological struggle over minds and wills. We must stop telling foreign publics what we want our own people to hear. Unless we get our information house in order, the United States will remain virtually unarmed in the battles that shape our future.

Just as good tactics cannot overcome a bad strategy, reorganization cannot solve systemic problems and limits. Now is the time to retool for the current and future fight. Our economic and physical security depends on it.